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Reflection is a fuzzy concept. In this article we reveal the paradoxes 
involved in studying the nature of reflection. Whereas some scholars 
emphasize its discursive nature, we go further and underline its 
resemblance to the self-biased dialogue Socrates had with the slave in 
Plato’s Meno. The individual and internal nature of the reflection process 
creates difficulty for studying it validly and reliably. We focus on 
methodological issues and use Hans Linschoten’s view of coupled systems 
(1964) to identify, analyze, and interpret empirical research on reflection. 
We argue that researcher and research subjects can have roles in several 
possible system couplings. Depending on who controls the manipulation of 
the stimulus, who controls the measuring instrument, who interprets the 
measurement and the response, different types of research questions can 
be answered. We conclude that reflection may be validly studied by 
combining different couplings of experimenter, manipulation, stimulus, 
subject, measurement, and response.  
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Abstract 
 
Reflection is a fuzzy concept. In this article we reveal the paradoxes involved in studying the 
nature of reflection. Whereas some scholars emphasize its discursive nature, we go further 
and underline its resemblance to the self-biased dialogue Socrates had with the slave in 
Plato’s Meno. The individual and internal nature of the reflection process creates difficulty for 
studying it validly and reliably. We focus on methodological issues and use Hans 
Linschoten’s view of coupled systems to identify, analyze, and interpret empirical research on 
reflection. We argue that researcher and research participants can take on roles in several 
possible system couplings. Depending on who controls the manipulation of the stimulus, who 
controls the measuring instrument, who interprets the measurement and the response, different 
types of research questions can be answered. We conclude that reflection may be validly 
studied by combining different couplings of experimenter, manipulation, stimulus, participant, 
measurement, and response. 
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coupled system, Linschoten, reflection, reflective practice, Socratic dialogue  
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Reflection: A Socratic Approach 
 
Ever since Plato, the philosophically good life has been propagated as a life that is permeated 
by reflection, that is, a life that aims at wisdom, at finding truth about our existence, and 
achieving a moral balance in our actions (Plato, 1997). “Man’s place in creation” was an 
accepted object for reflection. St. Augustine’s confessions (circa AD 400), for instance, 
demonstrated a possession with reflections on the relationship of the individual person to God 
and their conscience (Pusey, 1999). Ages later it became “Man's place in Nature” (Huxley, 
1906), and Edmund Husserl tried to find the foundation of science and logic in unbiased 
reflection (e.g., Husserl, 1900-01, 1936). 
Reflection stems from the Latin verb reflectere, meaning “to bend” or “to turn back on 
the self” (Reflection, n.d.). From an etymological origin a variety of meanings were derived, 
including whether and how persons can know or relate to themselves (Wiley, 1994). 
Reflection can be considered “a highly personal, cognitive process … in which a person takes 
an experience from the outside world, brings it inside the mind, turns it over, makes 
connections to other experiences, and filters it through personal biases” (Dewey, 1910/1933, 
p. 9). Definitions of reflection often depict a cognitive activity of questioning (e.g., Boud, 
Keogh, & Walker, 1985; Daudelin, 1996) alleged to have explorative, developmental, and 
interactive merits (e.g., Boud et al., 1985; Boyd & Fales, 1983; Brookfield, 1988). The role of 
self is prevalent in making sense of one’s own experiences (e.g., Boud et al., 1985; Boyd & 
Fales, 1983; Daudelin, 1996; Seibert & Daudelin, 1999).  
These definitions illustrate that reflection is considered a highly individual and internal 
process resembling a dialogue with oneself, and mainly inaccessible to others such as 
researchers. Nevertheless, we found reflection to be a tool of many trades. The process of 
reflection as well as its effects have been studied by scholars in philosophy, pedagogy, 
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management, and organizational psychology. Many studies either explicitly or implicitly refer 
to reflection as an inner dialogue between the self as a subject and an object (or object's 
processes). However, due to the nature of reflection, it is hard to avoid the temptation to use 
one’s reflective capacities to study reflection, and, like in Socrates' dialogue with the slave, to 
interrogate oneself, thus becoming one’s own slave. The subject of reflection scores high as a 
psychologist’s dilemma: to subject the self to science or science to the self (Leary, 1990). On 
the one hand, no mental activity asks for more validity and reliability for both science and 
self; yet, this can easily be confused (Halligan & Oakley, 2015; Krause, 2005). 
What is needed for reflection to be reliable and valid is an anchor point in a “reality” 
that is accessible to others for critical discussion. Ultimately, both researchers and reflecting 
individuals want reliable and valid conclusions about the perceptions, feelings, arguments, 
conclusions, and thoughts of their inner selves, often referring to these as “honesty” or 
“integrity.” In what follows, we suggest a useful approach to analyze and categorize the 
conceptual and methodological problems of studying reflection that was inspired by Hans 
Linschoten’s ideas of coupled systems1 (1964). Linschoten considered the relationship 
between a psychological researcher and their experimental “participant” as one in which two 
persons have roles in several possible system couplings. Application of his coupled systems 
approach to a methodologically diverse set of reflection studies reveals possible 
improvements to studying reflection that we will describe in the last part of this paper2. 
 
Selected Studies on Reflection 
 
Reflection is a popular research topic across various scientific disciplines. Within these 
disciplines methods like experiments, surveys, and qualitative studies have been used to 
uncover it. With the intention to provide a cross-sectional image of reflection studies, we 
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selected a methodologically diverse sample of the literature on reflection. Table 1 provides an 
overview of 18 articles that served as a base for our discussion.  
 
---------------------------------------------- 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
A comparison of the articles suggests that reflection has frequently been studied in the 
scientific domains of education, management, psychology, and philosophy. Psychology and 
management studies often focused on reflection effects (e.g., Anseel, Lievens, & Schollaert, 
2009; Masui & De Corte, 2005) and the development and validation of reflection measures 
(e.g., Schippers, Den Hartog, & Koopman, 2007; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Contributions 
in the education literature pursued the identification of reflective practices (e.g., Bruno, 
Galuppo, & Gilardi, 2011; Rogers, 2001). Some articles addressed reflection’s neurological 
location (e.g., D’Argembeau et al., 2005), personality features (e.g., Livengood, Sytsma, 
Feltz, Scheines, & Machery, 2010), and logical pitfalls or paradoxes (e.g., Davis & Klaes, 
2003). 
In general, reflection is considered a cognitive process to which individuals have to 
provide some effort (e.g., Bruno et al., 2011; D'Argembeau et al., 2005; Grant, Franklin, & 
Langford, 2002; Gürtner, Tschan, Semmer, & Nägele, 2007). In some studies, the affective 
process has been addressed as well in order to stress the emotional factors at stake (e.g., 
Jordan, 2010; Kember & Leung, 2000; Mann, Gordon, & MacLeod, 2009; Rogers, 2001; 
Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Apart from the interest in individual, cognitive, and affective 
processes, some articles discuss collective and reflective processes (e.g., Schippers et al., 
2007; Van Woerkom & Croon, 2008).  
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Conceptual comparison reveals three different approaches toward reflection. The first 
approach involves reflection in the presence of self-awareness. This approach emphasizes the 
investigation of personal knowledge structures by means of introspection (e.g., Mann et al., 
2009; Procee, 2006). The second approach considers reflection in terms of self-reference. 
Self-reference pays attention to the self-other relationship and stresses the evaluative rather 
than critical nature of reflection (e.g., Gürtner et al., 2007; Van Woerkom & Croon, 2008). 
The third approach is referred to as self-inquiry. Self-inquiry includes “epistemic” interest in 
the self by means of questioning assumptions one previously has taken for granted (e.g., 
Livengood et al., 2010; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).  
The different concepts of reflection have been classified according to timing (e.g., 
Jordan, 2010; Rogers, 2001; Schön, 1983, 1987), cognitive effort (e.g., Larrivee, 2008; 
Schippers et al., 2007) and level of reflection (e.g., Davis & Klaes, 2003; Kember & Leung, 
2000).  
Stimuli and intervention techniques give some indication of what makes people 
reflect. Practicing or learning-by-doing is considered an important stimulus for reflection 
(e.g., Jordan, 2010; Masui & De Corte, 2005). As such, reflection is used as a learning 
strategy, from which one can benefit the most when thinking back afterwards or even 
instantly about the effect or efficiency of the practices at hand. Feedback provided by relevant 
others (e.g., Mann et al., 2009) as well as behavioral evaluation (Schippers et al., 2007) are 
frequently mentioned as stimuli for reflection (see Table 1). Intervention techniques for 
reflection involve self-reports (e.g., Kember & Leung, 2000), evaluating task performance 
(e.g., Gürtner et al., 2007), coaching (e.g., Jordan, 2010), and journaling (e.g., Bruno et al., 
2011).  
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The main purpose scholars have attributed to reflection is the assessment of cognitive 
functioning (e.g., D’Argembeau et al., 2005; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Here, reflection is 
used to determine a person’s critical thinking skills. Other purposes are sense-making (e.g., 
Bruno et al., 2011; Jordan, 2010) and redirection or self-regulation skills (e.g., Anseel et al., 
2009; Procee, 2006). Livengood et al. (2010) have emphasized the importance of reflection as 
a merit or legitimization of one’s (cognitive) behavior. Other studies have suggested that 
reflection enhances performance. In their article, Mann et al. (2009) mentioned mixed effects 
of reflection on performance. This supports the negative and mixed effects from reflection on 
well-being (e.g., Lyke, 2009; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). With regard to understanding, 
again some studies demonstrate mixed or positive effects (e.g., Davis & Klaes, 2003; Grant et 
al., 2002; Jordan, 2010; Livengood et al., 2010; Rogers, 2001).  
The above suggests that a person reflects to qualify their own cognitive functioning in 
terms of task performance and critical understanding and to manage their own behavior. 
When a person’s thinking ends in vicious circles, reflection hampers well-being rather than 
improving performance. However, all studies seem to be caught in a chicken-and-egg 
situation: They suggest that reflection has positive results for cognitive functioning and for 
performance, but depend on the very same person's reports about their cognitive functioning, 
their performance, or the reception of a stimulus—if not incentive—to reflect. 
 
Problems Studying Reflection 
 
Recent discussions seem to concentrate more on the methodological nature of the challenge 
than on the deeper problem residing in research on reflection. Experimental tasks that aim to 
investigate reflection vary enormously within and across domains. They vary from 
demonstrations of internalized learning of study skills (Masui & De Corte, 2005), to written 
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individual and group discussions (Gürtner et al., 2007), elaboration with and without feedback 
(Anseel et al., 2009), solving math problems (Livengood et al., 2010), and reflecting on the 
self, others, or social issues during PET scans (D’Argembeau et al., 2005). With the exception 
of the neuropsychological experiment of D’Argembeau et al. (2005), they show little relation 
with self-reflection as studied through surveys. Only some of the studies have tried to 
distinguish levels of self-reflection. Moreover, many confounding factors surface, such as 
new ways of processing information (e.g., by email), using multiple-choice items (which 
seems a distinct type of activity from reflection), or learning to learn, which was not related to 
reflection as such. There was only limited transfer (or the measurement thereof) to other 
domains and limited long-term knowledge of applying reflection in resembling domains. 
Furthermore, authors found hardly any distinction between individual and group processes. In 
other words, a unifying paradigm has not yet been found, and if it is found it will not be easily 
related to the qualitative variations involved in reflection. The reporting of procedures, 
participants, and results not always conforms to what unequivocal conclusions require. 
However, as alarming as these methodological problems may be, they may obscure a 
deeper problem in reflection research. This has to do with the nature of reflection and the 
temptation to use one’s reflection capacities to study reflection, and like Socrates reflected in 
interrogating oneself, thus becoming one’s own Socratic slave. However, simultaneously 
addressing who reflects on what and what is represented reveals a paradox in reflection, 
resembling the infamous reflective paradox involving self-contradicting premises (Ashmore, 
1989; Bartlett & Suber, 1987). Combining the premises “Lying means not telling the truth,” 
and “I now do not tell the truth,” results in the paradox “I am now lying (about my telling the 
truth).” Since the act of combining both premises and the act of “lying” refer to the same 
person (the self), the truthfulness of the conclusion is uncertain. In other words, the subject 
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and the object of lying become identical. In reflection issues, the same seems to be the case: 
The actor and the observer of reflection are identical. 
Turning ourselves into objects overlooks the fact that this act of objectification is 
subjective in itself (Cunliffe & Jun, 2002). Or, in Hegelian terms, the subject has a permanent 
blind spot. Hegel illustrated this by a reflecting pole that can only see the other pole (the 
“reflectee”) and not itself (Wiley, 1994, p. 79). Or as Kant’s picture metaphor illustrates, 
“whenever the knower tries to know the knower it thereby turns the knower into the known. 
The knower knows the known, but not the knower” (Organ, 1987, discussing Kant, p. 115). 
Apparently, we can only discriminate these two elements in an analytical sense and not in a 
physical or statistical sense when confronted with locus issues.  
 
Linschoten’s System Couplings 
 
The problem may be illustrated with a view we borrowed from Dutch psychologist Hans 
Linschoten. Linschoten (1964) observed that psychologists seem to believe the position that 
all psychological knowledge about human beings is self-implicating. That is, psychologists’ 
scientific knowledge is also referring to themselves, and therefore self-committing and self-
biased. In other words, psychologists should apply whatever they know about human beings 
to psychologists as well. Consequently, the biases and prejudices psychologists observe 
human beings to have apply to psychologists as well (i.e., “Idols of the psychologist”3). 
 
---------------------------------------------- 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
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Linschoten considered the relationship between a psychological researcher (E) and their 
experimental “subject” (O; now “participant”) as one in which two persons have roles in 
several possible “system couplings.” In an experiment (Figure 1.1), a psychologist with the 
role of experimenter E has control over stimulus situation (x) and measuring instrument (m), 
whereas the observed participant (O) “controls” the response (r) to E’s manipulation (x). 
Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 reflect other couplings in which psychologists gain knowledge about 
the validity of the instrument (Figure 1.2), the reliability of the observer by comparing 
observations with those of others (Figure 1.3), and properties or traits of the participant, as in 
using questionnaires (Figure 1.4). In system couplings 1.3 and 1.4, E does not manipulate the 
stimulus to know its effect, but studies reactions to a “given” stimulus in order to get more 
insight into the properties of the measuring instrument or in characteristics of participants. 
Below, we further discuss the different couplings of systems involved in research, and give 
some examples. 
 
Examples of Coupled Systems in Reflection Studies 
 
Reflection has been studied by means of experiments, surveys, and qualitative studies. 
Researchers determine what to measure, how to measure, and how to interpret measurement 
outcomes; participants are subject to measurement and sometimes are (non)deliberately able 
to influence measurement outcomes. However, clear-cut as it seems, there is still some 
leeway. Earlier, we mentioned paradoxes and blind spots that are typical for reflection. The 
paradoxical nature of reflection is not restricted to the object of study, but often also involves 
measurement. For instance, how autonomous is the “self” that initiates reflection? Is reflective 
behavior probed by researchers distributing reflective tasks similar to “spontaneous” 
reflective behavior that is self-reported by participants? Whose reflective behavior is at stake: 
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that of the research participants, the researchers, or both? For example, on the one hand 
participants involved in an empirical study on their reflective behavior are subject to 
paradoxes and blind spots such as biased memories. Researchers, on the other hand, do not 
only have to identify participants’ blind spots, but also have to deal with their own paradoxes 
and blind spots. Linschoten’s coupled systems are informative to analyze these issues in 
empirical studies.  
Below we give some examples of reflection studies that can be characterized by the 
way systems are coupled. We do not pretend to cover all the studies and mixed methods 
published. To illustrate how in reflection research systems are coupled differently, we only 
discuss some striking examples. 
 
Coupled System #1: The Experiment  
 
In experiments, the researcher (E) has control over the stimulus (x) and the measurement 
phase (m). After stimulation, the participant (O) responds (r). The focus in this coupling is on 
the effect of x (independent variable) in terms of r (dependent variable), and m is used to 
establish the effect.  
For instance, in an experiment by Masui and De Corte (2005) young participants had 
to formulate study recommendations for themselves and for peers, and establish relations 
between their personal study behavior and good and weaker study results in two previously 
followed domain-specific courses. The experimental treatment involved training sessions in— 
as well as practice and transfer tasks on—self-regulated learning. These sessions and tasks 
included the self in relation to social relations and the self in relation to consequences of study 
behavior (“the future profession”). In this coupled system (#1), the experimenter had control 
over the stimulus (a set of instructions) and the measurement (attribution and reflective 
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behavior measurements, as well as academic achievements); the participant had control over 
the response, that is, his reflective behavior. According to Linschoten’s systems criteria, 
Anseel et al. (2009) conducted an experiment investigating the effect of reflection on 
performance. They provoked experimental “reflection” in feedback or no-feedback task 
conditions. The authors (E) defined four task conditions (x) in which participants (O) had to 
select an answer to different work emails and (a) write down examples of their own strong 
and weak task performance based on performance feedback (reflection/feedback task), (b) do 
so without such feedback (reflection/no feedback task), (c) not write down anything but 
receive feedback, or (d) write down and not receive feedback. Next, they had to do similar 
email-response test tasks (r), and performances (m) between the four different 
feedback/reflection conditions were analyzed. Feedback with reflection generated highest test 
performance.  
 
Coupled System #2: Calibration  
 
In calibration studies, the main aim is to establish the validity of the instrument (Figure 1.2). 
In other words, the psychologist is interested in the precise way the measuring instrument 
relates to responses by participants. Studies use the measured strength of the stimulus in 
relation to the kind and/or strength of the response. The focus in this coupling is on the 
validity or standardization of m, using the effect of x (independent variable) on r (dependent 
variable) in case m is used to establish effects of r. 
One way to validate findings in reflection research is to triangulate methods, such as 
interview, observation, and document analysis (see Denzin, 1978). In an extensive study, 
Carson and Fisher (2006) “raised the bar” by indicating how the reflective quality of student 
writings can be established by using identification procedures of values, beliefs, assumptions; 
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changes in these values, beliefs, and assumptions; their making connections to political, 
social, and cultural values; and changing their habits. Scott (2009) empirically tested the 
usefulness of portfolios as learning tools. The research question in this “calibration study” 
was straightforward: “Is student portfolio use positively associated with reflection?” (p. 62). 
In other words, can we use portfolios to establish serious reflection? Portfolios were offered to 
students as a stimulus to reflect on learning and performance in an MBA course. The effect on 
reflection performance was established by measuring the level of reflection exhibited in an 
exam paper. Apparently, that was not the only aim of her study. The portfolio stimulus used in 
the study was also validated by a qualitative evaluation of the students’ excerpts from their 
portfolios to establish whether the stimulus actually elicited reflection.  
 
Coupled System #3: Self-Calibration  
 
According to Linschoten, self-calibration takes place when the focus of the researcher is on 
improving the interpretation of the measurement instrument. In a more straightforward 
measurement situation the focus is on preventing “reading errors” of instruments, the correct 
interpretation of test results, and so forth. The experimenter does not control the stimulus, but 
is interested in the question of whether he or she rightly interprets the measured response.  
Christie and Menhuir (1997) studied (E) what a “reflective practitioner” means and 
how the process of reflection can be operationalized and evaluated in the context of the 
continuing professional development (CPD) of those who work in the field of early education. 
This is an example of how teachers (O) can be supported to evoke (x) more reflection 
techniques in their pupils (r), and at the same time it gives an example of how they can “self-
calibrate” their method of establishing progress (m) in their students. Another example is 
Jordan’s study (2010) who, as a participant observer (E) observed and interviewed (m) novice 
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nurses (O) of an anesthesiology department to become reflective practitioners, addressing 
different dimensions of reflective attitudes, and how to interpret the “measurement” of them. 
Jordan investigated how organizational practices (x) fostered reflection-in-action in a high 
reliability context (r), by categorizing her field observations of seven novice nurse anesthetists 
(verbal and nonverbal communication), narratives, interviews, or document analyses into 
different theoretical dimensions that structured the thick descriptions (an ethnographic 
approach).  
 
Coupled System #4: Measurement  
 
There are many examples of studies in which there is negligible or no stimulation by the 
researcher. The researcher, however, controls the measuring instrument, as in a survey or 
questionnaire, and establishes any response of a participant that can be interpreted as a 
reflective practice. Another way to ascertain an external effect more independently is to use 
modern neuropsychological technology during reported reflection in order to obtain more 
objective measurements of reflective activity. For example, Northoff et al. (2006) and Saxe, 
Moran, Scholz, and Gabrieli (2006) used neurological measurements. In their 
neuropsychological experiment, D’Argembeau et al. (2005), (E) used three topics to evoke (x) 
reflection: reflection on one’s personality, reflection on someone else’s personality, and 
reflection on social issues. To identify the dependent variable (r) 
 
immediately after each scan, subjects were asked to verbally report the thoughts, 
images, and/or memories they had had while they were reflecting on the topic. Then 
they rated several aspects of the mental activity they had experienced during the scan, 
including amount of thoughts (i.e., total amount of thoughts experienced, whatever 
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their content); relative amount of thoughts about the self; thoughts about other 
persons; memories; physical sensations and combined those ratings with 
measurements of brain metabolism patterns through PET scans. (p. 620)  
 
They inferred that self-reflection differs from reflection on others or society and from a 
resting state, although during rest some similar patterns were visible, both in the metabolism 
scans and in the self-ratings. Apparently, self-reflection plays an important role during rest. 
 
Coupled System #5: Spurious Coupling  
 
For our study, spurious coupling is a most relevant system coupling. Linschoten referred to 
number five as “spurious” because, as he called it, “science appears as power” (1964, p. 157). 
No reliable or valid knowledge is collected (p. 157). The psychologist or their client wants a 
certain result of the study, and stimulates and measures just long enough to attain the wanted 
result. His examples seem to refer to applying power that disguises as scientific knowledge, as 
you often see in advertisements of dubious products, using the phrase “scientifically proven.” 
For instance, we forbid our client to use the word polar bear and we observe that the client 
does not use the word polar bear, or worse: we report that the client does not think about polar 
bears. In our study, reflection could border on spuriousness if we use reflections to “prove” 
how—or that—reflection has the effect we wished for. For instance, in a study on distributed 
shared sense-making, Ladewski, Krajcik, and Palincsar (2007) theorized that  
 
inquiry and reflection are mutually constitutive processes that play a key role in 
human flexible shared sense-making, enabling sense-making systems (individual and 
collective) to “open” to consider multiple possible options and then to “close” to the 
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“best fit” option for a particular situation based on criteria such as reproducibility, 
coherence, and fruitfulness. (pp. 45-46) 
 
They tested their theoretical frame by documenting reflections and prediction or what they 
called “sense-making activities” of students and do not collect other performance data or data 
from comparison classrooms. In a post-graduate course for pharmacists, Black and Plowright 
(2010) exposed their students to a systematic reflective learning strategy and a written 
reflective portfolio. Next, they asked focus groups and individuals in an interview to reflect 
upon reflective learning, resulting in a multidimensional model of reflection. They argued that 
reflective learning is more complicated than usually described. In both cases it seemed that a 
model of reflection that the investigators already must have had in mind was used to reflect on 
the model of reflection that was under construction. It is a Socratic situation.  
Table 2 classifies types of studies based on Linschoten's coupled systems, including an 
extended meretricious coupling (to be discussed below).  
 
---------------------------------------------- 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
An Additional System: The Meretricious Coupling 
 
In addition to the original set of five couplings, our analysis suggests a sixth one. In this 
situation, the participant’s (or subject’s) role (O) cannot be distinguished from the role of the 
psychologist (E), and the measurement (m) and response (r) have faded into the mind of the 
experimentalist/object as well. The psychologist as his/her own object, as it were, administers 
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his/her own stimulus (x) and has the response “in his/her head,” and designed the 
measurement as well. As a name, we propose “the meretricious coupling.” We suspect that 
the meretriciously coupled system relates to spurious coupling. The reflecting individual 
actually plays two if not three roles: to be their own psychologist, to be their own object, and 
to be their own judge of successful reflecting. In spurious coupling, two parties are involved, 
the researcher and the client who wants to get the result of the study that he or she demanded; 
in meretricious coupling, both parties are one and the same person. Figure 2 demonstrates the 
spurious interdependency of meretricious coupling. 
 
---------------------------------------------- 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Conceptually, this seems to be the basic problem if not paradox with reflection as a technique 
for thinking about our own behavior, thinking, learning, and its improvement (in the eyes of 
which beholder?). In the Cartesian situation, I can obser e another’s behavior (but not their 
inner experience), and they can observe my behavior (but not my inner experience). This 
resolves the question of whether we deal with a knower who is open to the external world 
(although it is internally represented), or with a self-contained knower, closed to the world, 
for whom all things that seem real are the mere product of imagination and construction: 
Descartes versus Vico, Popper versus Wittgenstein, Munz versus Rorty (Munz, 1984, 1985; 
Rorty, 1980). Regardless of whatever insight we gain about ourselves, we can only be our 
own judges of the validity of insight. In terms of objectivity, there is no way that for insight 
and the test of its validity, traces of the knower can be removed or ignored.  
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Therefore, we cannot reasonably be sure that we are honest and reliable instruments for the 
assessment of the truthfulness of our reflections. Notwithstanding its personal worth and 
explorative value, all personal diaries, log books, and other journaling, blogging, and vlogging 
initiatives fit this meretricious coupling, at least whenever authors use them as arguments for 
the validity and reliability of reflection.  
We consider it defendable that any attempt to design experiments that go deeper than 
looking at the effect of alleged reflection tasks will result in serious problems as soon as 
reflection is seen as a mental process in which words are used as definite indicators of inner 
thought processes. Experiments that report effects of what only roughly is indicated as 
“reflection” may demonstrate that instructing to reflect can help. They do not demonstrate 
that reflection works, let alone how it works. Many seem to claim to be effect studies but fail 
to be so and are at best calibration or self-calibration studies.  
A way to approach this problem is to look at the opportunities offered by triangulation, 
for instance with neuropsychological data. It is not our aim to study brain processes during 
mental activities to find the exact spot where reflection is located. However, 
neuropsychological evidence can help to validate whether or not an alleged mental process 
corresponds with a related brain process (Wegner, 2002). We discuss this approach in the next 
section.  
 
Implications 
 
From the above we can conclude that the concept of reflection can have many different 
meanings and interpretations. Is reflection considered thinking? Is it conscious thinking? Or 
thinking about consciousness? Consciousness of what (DaSilveira, DeSouza, & Gomes, 
2015)?4 Does reflection occur intentionally, and if it does, to what extent should we consider 
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it truthful if it concerns only conscious and intentional thinking? How do we manage self-
bias? Is the scope of reflection restricted to actions rather than to thinking?  
The objects of reflection, and especially the self as object, are often subject to 
discussion. Reflection is doubted as a reliable source of representing reality, including one’s 
own place in reality. Most of our cognitive processes are inaccessible to consciousness. Since 
there are, for now, no means of observing the contents of personal thought independently of 
thought, the self-reflecting person is trapped in a reflexive paradox. This includes the 
psychologist and results in considering reflection to be a state of mind where attitudes and 
intentions are invented as explanations of one’s behavior during events or phases one 
happened to participate in. It results in a self-constructed story.  
 
Research Program on Reflection 
 
To overcome the problems of the self-implicated nature of reliable and valid psychological 
knowledge about reflection, and the “meretriciousness” of reflection, we will now briefly 
suggest additional ways to investigate the true nature of reflection. The actual issues are 
twofold: (a) does the participant really reflect on his/her focal problem and (b) what processes 
are involved in reflection?  
 
---------------------------------------------- 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Based on Linschoten’s coupled systems, we suggest an “ideal” research design, consisting of 
multiple research waves. The first wave involves a basic research design that refers to coupled 
Page 19 of 42
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/thpsyc
Theory and Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
      20 
 
 
system 1. Next, subsequent waves serve to separately validate Linschoten’s coupling elements 
X, O, r, m, and E. As such, coupled system 1 is more or less “quintangulated” to arrive at an 
ideal design for a research program in which each separate element is controlled for. For 
instance, the reflective task or prompt (x) is compared with a self-reflective task—asking the 
participant to suggest a relevant question for him/her to start reflecting (cf. content validity). 
Participants’ (O) consequent and unadulterated responses to the reflective and self-reflective 
tasks are checked by means of combining intentional verbal responses with unintentional 
physical responses (cf. criterion validity). To validate participants’ responses (r) in itself, 
comparisons with “relevant others,” for example, friends and relatives (cf. 360-degree 
feedback) as well as between cultures could be helpful. With regard to measurement (m), 
combination of multiple methods such as fMRI (e.g., what are the active brain parts), eye-
tracking (e.g., selective and first attention), and verbal responses (e.g., self-reports, diaries) 
could be informative. Finally, the activities of the researcher or experimenter (E) are validated 
by testing his/her interpretations and first focus (e.g., eye-tracking of reading fMRI results) in 
relation to other relevant researchers (cf. inter-encoder or interrater reliability).  
For time, access, and budget restrictions, a research design containing five waves may 
be Utopian in itself. However, each wave addresses subsequent questions5 that are necessary 
to answer in order to disentangle reflection. Even a triple wave design using fMRI or PET 
scans can help to avoid some of the pitfalls and biases that impair many studies on reflection. 
For instance, being involved in a reflective task, research participants could be shown a 
photograph expressing a universal emotion. Next, participants’ immediate responses could be 
traced by measuring a physiological response (fMRI), signal first attention (eye-tracking), and 
asking for a comment (interpretation). This would help researchers detect becoming aware of 
the activities involved in reasoning about a certain human emotion. To investigate a self-
reflective task would involve another wave in which participants are invited to feedback on 
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their own behavior. For instance, participants could be asked to describe and explain their 
emotions when seeing the photograph. Additionally, they could be encouraged to suggest 
some reflective questions themselves, which in their mind would help to make sense of the 
photograph. 
Although it is not our aim to find the location of the “organs” of reflection (if they 
exist at all), we hypothesize that there are processes involved in reflection that differ from, for 
example, “mere” thought or problem-solving. To investigate, two elements must be observed. 
One concerns the nature of the “experimental task,” the other the probable nature of reflection 
as a Socratic dialogue. 
Traditionally, the approach has been to ask the participant to reflect on a certain 
problem and report the results. Concerning the experimental task, we suggest that the 
approach taken long ago by Shepard (1982) and Shepard and Cooper (1986) to present 
participants with a binary imagery problem and ask for the right interpretation, can act as an 
example. Shepard and Cooper presented their participants briefly with a 3D block structure, 
and next again briefly with a rotated version of it, or with a rotated and mirrored version. 
Participants were to answer the question whether or not the second one was the mirrored 
version of the first one. The experimenter’s measurement was whether the participant had it 
right, which lead to an unequivocal conclusion: Does he/she use mental imagery effectively or 
not? Transposing this to the reflection problem would lead to experiments in which the 
participants are asked to use reflection to “solve” a problem with two possible answers, one of 
which the experimenter knows is right. Similarly, regarding the task used by Livengood et al. 
(2010), who presented participants with mathematical problems from the Cognitive 
Reflectivity Test developed by Frederick (2005), it could be argued that this involves not so 
much reflection, but mere problem-solving or thought. To deal with that, we would like to 
suggest several comparisons. One comparison is between fMRI scans of participants’ 
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activities while solving mathematical problems from the Cognitive Reflectivity Test and 
fMRI scans of participants’ activities answering the following question: “Think of what 
questions the researcher should ask you to establish what you are considering when reflecting 
on a subject of your own choice.” The latter question is an open question. However, it 
prevents the criticism that participants do not reflect but only solve the problem of what to say 
when the experimenter asks to reflect about a specified subject. It is our impression that a 
question like this invites true reflection. Additionally, we suspect that the comparison of the 
fMRI scans of both tasks indicates different brain processes that might be involved in 
reflection other than mere thought or problem-solving, thus giving the opportunity to check 
on “real” reflective activity. 
Though very difficult to realize, another more complicated way to study the 
phenomenon allows answers to some deeper questions. In the meretricious coupling situation, 
the supposed subsystems of experimenter and participant are not independent but coupled 
systems, as they are in an experimental situation. Actually, experimenter and participant are 
one and the same person. In philosophical terms, this is the reflection situation in optima 
forma. With an open attitude, and with every self-inspired question to ask oneself, an honest 
and fair answer is possible. However, psychologically speaking, there are many reasons why 
this will not result in honest and fair answers. The temptations of self-protecting and self-
indulging answers, let alone self-implicating biases and self-betrayal, are unavoidable. 
Following the interesting suggestions made by D’Argembeau et al. (2005), our suggestion is 
to investigate the involvement of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) in meretricious 
coupling. That is, the experimenter/participant should be followed during the whole process 
(or all phases of the process) involved in reflection. The reason for this is that on the one 
hand, it appears necessary to gain insight into the reflection process as a whole from self-
posed questions to self-given answers, and on the other hand to control for self-serving biases. 
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Technical and practical problems provided, we think these are what conceptually seem to be 
necessary steps. It gives room for the phenomenologically or philosophically suggested 
typical features of reflection, while it constrains the experimental situation sufficiently to 
provide reliable and valid answers.  
 
Caveats and Conclusions 
 
Reflection on Reflection  
 
One caveat that can be made to our suggestions is that reflection has been given many 
meanings. As one reviewer of our original manuscript adequately remarked, reflection and 
self-reflection should be distinguished. Of course, the reviewer is right. However, we think 
there is no fundamental difference. Both involve the self as the locus or subject of a reflection 
as well as the object or focus of the reflection. One could reflect on, say, the sentence, “Even 
the president of the United States sometimes must have to stand naked” (Dylan, 1965, 7th 
stanza, Lines 5-6), but this would only be called reflection if it involves the self's own inner 
experiences with that sentence. If not, it would be called, perhaps, critical thinking or artistic 
interpretation. It naturally implies that reflection always involves a reflecting person's 
thoughts and other experiences. “The self” cannot be the focus of a reflection other than, 
either, the word self (in which case it is a thought of a person about a word), or of the self (in 
which case it is a thought of a person about a person that happens to have the same identity). 
The first case is trivial, the second probably impossible.  
      
Blind Spot (Reflective Paradox) of Psychology 
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Another caveat concerns the reflective paradox of psychology or what could be called its 
blind spot. Indeed, as William James (1890) identified as “the great snare of the psychologist” 
(p. 196), it is easy for psychologists to confuse what their participant thinks with what the 
psychologist thinks. When I see a hole somewhere under a tree, it is easier for the 
psychologist to think that their participant also sees a rat hole, if the psychologist knows about 
rats and their holes (as many of them seem to do). It is the blind spot of the psychologist to 
not realize that his or her participant might just see a rabbit hole. Again this includes what can 
happen in reflection research: Is it reflection in the eye of the beholder or in the eye of the 
psychologist? 
  
Socrates' Slave and Socrates' Self  
 
Having found multiple problems at several levels in studies of reflection, we conclude that a 
more thorough understanding of the conceptual problems involved in reflection is needed. 
Our analysis suggests that reflection could still be seen as a substitute dialogue with another 
person. The psychology of reflection might be inspired by methods used for a century or more 
in penal law. Asking a person to self-reflect with the possibility that a third person might “fact 
check” all assertions might help to unravel the methodological and conceptual knots 
psychology is in. It would be of key value for attaining positive results. 
Another inspiration might be found in the way the use of mental imagery is tested by 
presenting participants with two-choice questions about 3D structures (Metzler & Shepard, 
1982; Shepard, 1982). It would resemble the Socratic method, though not so much as a 
rhetorical device, but as a forced choice designed to check true reflectivity.  
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A different approach will come from neuropsychology. We do not suggest that 
reduction of neurological events gives definite answers. Nevertheless, neurological evidence 
can help to control for claims about the relationship between behavior and internal intentions, 
reflected or otherwise.  
In general, claims that reflection helps to improve action by learning to better respond 
to complex situations could benefit from triangulation, if not quadrangulation or 
quintangulation, of methods that are insufficient on their own. Reflection as an inner 
argument needs anchor points to reality. As in law, stories of what happened (who did what, 
why did he do it, is it punishable behavior?) need anchor points for a judge or jury to decide 
on prosecution.  
Overall, we suppose that reflection is truly Socratic. Superficially, it resembles a 
dialogue and could be called discursive, as suggested elsewhere (Larrain & Haye, 2012). On a 
deeper level, we suggest that reflection resembles the actual content of what Socrates 
presented to the docile slave. Socrates gave him rhetorical questions, that is, answers phrased 
as questions to which the obedient slave could only answer with a “yes” or, depending on the 
question, with a “no.” The slight difference with the “real” Socrates is that our inner Socrates 
cannot avoid any demand characteristics (Orne, 1962), and that our inner slave has a self-
interest in the answer.  
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 End Notes 
                                                            
1 Linschoten's Christian name was “Johannes.” In everyday life he liked to be called 
“Hans” which is the usual abbreviated form of “Johannes” in Dutch. In the text we refer to 
“Hans” and in references we use the name Johannes. In his publications he used either 
“Johannes” or “Prof. dr. J. Linschoten.” However, the American translation of his volume on 
William James, published after his death, used “Hans.” 
2 For more information about Linschoten's study see Van Hezewijk & Stam (2008). 
3 Note that “idols” is used here in the Baconian sense of obstacles facing humans to 
find truth about nature. Bacon suggested idols were the unintended consequence of our 
language, of the market, tribe, etc. 
4 We would like to follow the phenomenologist observation that consciousness is not a 
function that can be studied in and of itself; consciousness is always about something. We 
cannot go into further detail here. The reader could refer to Linschoten’s study of the work of 
William James (Linschoten, 1968). 
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5 The accompanying research questions may be too simple, but must more or less 
involve: 
x: What is the object of reflection? What initiates the reflection process? 
O: What (who) is the subject of reflection? 
r: How do (effects of reflection) manifest themselves? 
m: What cues can be taken to refer to the reflection processes? What physical and 
mental processes and/or effects can be observed? How do we (researchers) define and 
operationalize reflection? How do researchers cope with the subjectivity and selectivity of 
own interpretations? 
E: Who controls the spectator (see Davis & Klaes, 2003) that observes reflection by 
another subject? Additionally, how do the spectator and the reflecting subject relate to one 
another? How do we demarcate the research design, to avoid endless relativity? 
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Table 1 
Selected Studies on Reflection and Inclusion Criteria 
Author Journal Method Reflection 
Stimulus 
Intervention 
Technique 
1. Anseel et al. 
(2009) 
Organizational 
Behavior and 
Human 
Decision 
Processes 
Experiment Feedback F Coached 
reflection 
C 
2. Bruno et al. 
(2011) 
European 
Journal of 
Psychology of 
Education 
Qualitative 
study 
(Content 
analysis) 
Become a 
trainer “for a 
day” 
P Writing a 
personal 
journal 
J 
3. D’Argembeau 
et al. (2005) 
NeuroImage 
 
PET, (f)MRI Focus mental 
activity on 
specific topics 
S Reflective 
tasks 
TP 
4. Davis & 
Klaes (2003) 
Journal of 
Economic 
Methodology 
Essay/ 
Literature 
review 
There is more 
than one 
possible 
strategy to 
respond to the 
various 
dimensions of 
reflexivity. 
E Considered as 
phenomenon 
rather than 
intervention 
technique 
TP 
5. Grant et al. 
(2002) 
Social 
Behavior and 
Personality 
Survey Journal of 
diary keeping 
S Questionnaire SR 
6. Gürtner et al. 
(2007) 
Organizational 
Behavior and 
Human 
Decision 
Processes 
Experiment Training by 
means of 
guided 
reflection: 
team-based 
military air-
surveillance 
task 
P Reflexivity 
intervention 
TP 
7. Jordan (2010) Management 
Learning 
Qualitative 
study 
(Ethnography, 
narrative) 
Explicit and 
indirect 
reference to 
diversity and 
the necessity 
of asking 
questions 
Monthly 
rotation 
Interactive on-
the-job 
training 
Alternation of 
P Question 
routinized 
ways 
Interactive 
practices 
C 
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peripheral 
and full 
participation 
(learning-by-
doing) 
Case-based 
teaching 
Emphasis on 
reconstructin
g abstracted 
rules 
8. Kember & 
Leung (2000) 
Assessment & 
Evaluation in 
Higher 
Education 
Survey Class 
evaluation 
F Questionnaire SR 
9. Larrivee 
(2008) 
Reflective 
practice 
 
Survey Emotionally 
supportive 
learning 
climate 
Mediation 
processes  
F Prompts 
Journaling 
Non-
judgmental 
questioning 
J 
10. Livengood et 
al. (2010) 
Philosophical 
Psychology 
Experiment Personality, 
Philosophical 
training 
P Cognitive 
reflection test 
SR 
11. Lyke (2009) Personality 
and Individual 
Differences 
Experiment Psychotherapy E Questionnaire  SR 
12. Mann et al. 
(2009) 
Advances in 
Health 
Sciences 
Education 
Essay/ 
Literature 
review 
Awareness of 
a need or 
disruption in 
usual practice 
Anticipatory 
phase 
Appropriate 
supervision 
Novel or 
challenging 
situations 
Intellectually 
and 
emotionally 
supportive 
environment 
P 
F 
Observational 
methods 
Analytical 
methods 
SR 
C 
13. Masui & De 
Corte (2005) 
British Journal 
of Educational 
Psychology 
Experiment Training P Questionnaire SR 
14. Procee (2006) Educational 
Theory 
 
Essay/ 
Literature 
review 
Reflection 
partners 
Exercise 
Empathy 
P Intelligence 
(Kant’s 
Verstand) 
Judgment 
TP 
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(Kant’s 
Urteilskraft) 
15. Rogers (2001) Innovative 
Higher 
Education 
 
Essay/ 
Literature 
review 
Coaching 
Uncertainty 
E Journaling 
Role 
modeling 
Use of 
questions 
Critical 
incidents 
J 
16. Schippers et 
al. (2007) 
Applied 
Psychology: 
An 
international 
review 
Survey Team work E Questionnaire SR 
17. Trapnell & 
Campbell 
(1999) 
Journal of 
Personality 
and Social 
Psychology 
Survey Self-focus S Questionnaire SR 
18. Van 
Woerkom & 
Croon (2008) 
Personnel 
Review 
 
Survey Experience P Questionnaire SR 
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Figure 1. Five ways that an experimenter, his instruments and his participant can be coupled. See text 
for explanation.  
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Table 2 
Classification of Empirical Studies on Reflection, Based on Linschoten’s Coupled Systems, 
with One Added by the Present Authors 
Coupled System Researcher Influences 
the Experimental 
Intervention X 
Participant 
Influences 
Response R 
Measurement’s Function 
1 The 
experiment 
Yes Yes Researcher tests effect of 
intervention 
2 Calibration Yes Yes Researcher tests validity of 
measurement 
3 Self-
calibration 
No Yes Researcher tests validity of 
his/her own interpretation 
4 Measurement No No Researcher measures an 
external, non-controlled for 
effect 
5 Spurious 
coupling 
Yes No Researcher intervenes and 
measures to obtain a wanted 
result 
Addition: 
6 Meretricious 
coupling 
No Yes Researcher = participant 
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Figure 2. Meretricious coupling #6 (inspired by Linschoten, 1964). 
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Figure 3. “Ideal” research design in which coupled system 1 is “quintangulated.”  
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